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Relief Sought on Appeal 
The Appellant appeals on the law only, and 
seeks the court to over rule the decision of the trial 
court. 
Statement of, Facts 
The Defendant is a Municipal Corporation of 
the State of Utah and duly enacted an ordinance which was 
codified as Chapter 18.04 of the Revised Ordinances of 
Provo City, 1964, which Chapter was amended on the 12th 
day of December, 1974, by the passage of Ordinance no.388. 
The Ordinance makes it unlawful for any per-
son, firm or corporation other than the Waste Removal 
Department of the City, to 'collect, remove, or dispose 
of garbage or waste matter, in the City on a commercial 
basis, or for hire. The Ordinance preserves the right for 
any person to haul their own garbage or waste material 
to the garbage dump and specifically allows the person 
who produces or the owner of the premises where garbage 
is produced to haul garbage which is suitable for hog 
feed. 
While the Ordinance was in effect a tempor-
ary paper shortage drove the price of waste paper pro-
ducts to an unusually high level and the defendant, who 
operates a commercial disposal system in the nearby com-
munity of Lindon, commenced hauling garbage and parti-
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cularly waste paper products from at least two sources 
within Provo City, to-wit: Reams Grocery Store and 
Heilner Manufacturing, a small manufacturing business. 
Plaintiff was notified to desist from-violation of the 
Ordinance and brought this action to directly challenge 
the constitutionality of the Ordinance and the authority 
of the City to enact such a regulation. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
AN ORDINANCE PROVISION LIMITING 
TO THE MUNICIPALITY, THE RIGHT 
TO COLLECT AND DISPOSE OF GARBAGE 
AND WASTE IS A PROPER EXERCISE 
OF THE MUNICIPALITYfS POLICE AND 
OTHER POWERS, 
The Plaintiff-appellantfs brief seeks to 
draw a distinction between the power to regulate and the 
power to absolutely prohibit the activity of garbage and 
waste collection. The Appellantfs brief also seeks to 
have the court believe that the only power of prohibition 
is found in Section 10-8-61, UCA, 1953 as amended. 
This is of course not the only specific 
authorization in state law under which the City may re-
gulate waste disposal. See 10-8-24, with respect to 
Regulations of Refuse in Public Places; 10-8-30 with 
respect to Traffic Regulation; 10-8-39 with respect to 
the Licensing of Business, including Drayman; 10-8-43 
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with respect to regulation of Markets, and Sale of Food 
Stuffs; 10-8-44 regulating and providing for Inspection 
and Control of Food Stuffs; 10-8-56 with respect to 
Combustible and Explosive Substances and Materials; 10*-
8-60 with respect to Abatement of Nuisances; 10-8-61 with 
respect to regulations of Garbage and Prevention of Dis-
ease; 10-8-66 with respect to Regulations of Offensive 
Businesses, 
In addition, the Supreme Court of Utah has 
held that it is patently within the police power of a 
City to regulate garbage and waste disposal apart and 
aside from any specific statutory authority. See Salt 
Lake City vs. Bernhagen, 18'9 P. 583, 56 Utah 159 at Page 
586 wherein the Court quotes from Dillon on Municipal 
Corporations, Section 678 (5th ed.): 
"the removal and disposal of 
garbage, offal and other refuse 
matter is recognized as a proper 
subject for the exercise of the 
power of a municipality to pass 
ordinances to promote the public 
health, comfort and safety.... 
Founded upon the foregoing con-
siderations it is therefore 
within the power of the City, 
not only to impose reasonable 
restrictions and regulations 
upon the manner of removing 
garbage, but also, if it sees 
fit, to assume the exclusive 
control of the subject, and 
to provide that garbage and 
refuse matter shall only be 
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removed by the officers of the 
City, or by a contractor hired 
by the City or by some single 
individual to whom exclusive 
license is granted for the purpose. 
An exclusive right so created is 
not open to the objections that 
is it a monopoly/1 
The court in the Bernhagen case further 
quotes, Gardner vs, Michigan 199 U.S. 330, 26 Supreme 
Court 108, 50 L, ed, 212, wherein the Supreme Court of 
the United States approved the instruction of the trial 
court as a correct statement of the law which instruction 
read as follows; 
''Defendant in this case was 
transporting 'what confessedly 
was garbage. It is well settled 
that no one may claim damages 
because of enforced obedience 
to a police regulation designed 
to secure and protect public 
health. It is manifest that 
were individuals permitted 
to escape the regulation fixed 
by a common council and dispose 
of garbage as they severally 
saw fit, all systems in the 
collection in the removal of 
refuse matter would be dest-
royed. Even if this gargage 
have some value or some such 
use as that to which the res-
pondent or employer put it, 
the feeding of hogs, the Court 
will not, at the expense of 
the public health, recognize 
that this refuse matter in 
its common legal aspect is 
property. No property right 
has therefore, been violated." 
Subsequent to the Bernhagen case, the 
Legislature of the State of Utah, amended Section 
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10-8-61 to allow a person to transport his own garbage 
and kitchen refuse, This amendment was done in the laws 
of 1921. 
Thereafter, the only other Utah State Supreme 
Court case that touches on the question of Municipal Reg-
ulations of Garbage occured in the case of Retan et al 
vs. Salt Lake City, 63 Utah 459, 226 P. 1095 (May 29, 
1924.) 
The issue in the Retan case was whether the 
City had power under its police power to ignore an exclusive 
franchise which had been given to the Plaintiff in the 
case for collection of useable garbage and the court found 
that the police power was sufficient to over come the 
contract right. The court held on page 1097: 
"No matter what the terms of 
the contract, it is subject to 
the right of the City to exercise 
its police power for the public 
benefit. And to the lawful 
exercise of such power the 
provisions of the contract must 
yield, even though their purposes 
are defeated.ff 
The Court then makes reference to the 
amendment made by the change in the laws of Utah in 1921-
and says; 
"It is clear that the purpose 
of this amendment was to deprive 
the City Governments of the power 
to absolutely prevent private 
persons from disposing of their 
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own garbage, and to secure such 
right to owners of garbage, under 
such uniform and reasonable re-
gulation as the City might pre-
scribe therefore, 
The legislature by the amendment 
referred to, prescribed a limitation 
on the power of the City, in the 
respect mentioned, and required 
it to depart from a policy which 
it formerly might or might have 
not done in its discretion.ff 
No other cases have been tried before the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah, on the precise issue 
presented in this Appeal, Many, many cases in other 
jurisdictions however, have held that the police power, 
with or without expressed'statutory authorization has been 
held to be sufficient to allow the city to prohibit any 
other persons from engaging in the business of collection 
of garbage and trash. See McQuillin on Municipal 
Corporation, Section 24.249; 
"A city may forbid the commercial 
removal of house dirt, trash and 
the like without a license; it may 
perform the function; or it may let 
a contract, which may be exclusive 
for the service.1' 
See also McQuillin, Municipal Corporation, 
Section 24,250; 
"Municipal corporations, frequently 
perform the service of collecting 
and removing all garbage, trash 
and similar substances, and pro-
hibit any other person from en-
gaging in that business. A 
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municipality may do this under 
its police or general power to 
provide for the health of its 
inhabitants and to prevent and 
abate nuisances. It may do so 
even though it has charter 
power to let a contract for the 
purpose, it may provide that all 
scavager work within it be done 
by a person appointed by it and 
prohibit anyone else from en-
gaging in any such work. At 
least it may prohibit anyone 
but City officials or a con-
tractor with the City from re-
moving such matters, where they 
are a nuisance, offensive or 
likely to be dangerous to the 
public health. The gathering of 
garbage is not a trade, business 
or occupation, but it is a public 
duty, to be performed by a City 
in a manner that will best per-
mote the health of the inhabitants.M 
The footnote on the bottom of Page 
94 of the cited quotation from McQuillin lists Supreme 
Court decisions from many, many states. An excellent 
annotation covering the subject is attached to the case 
of Strub vs. Village of Deerfield, an Illinois Supreme 
Court case in 1960, 167 NE 2(d) 83, ALR 2(d) 795. 
The facts in that case are very similar to 
those in the instant case, the Plaintiff claimed that 
the limitations on his savenger activities violated the 
due process clause, created a monopoly in contrevention 
of the common law and the state constitution. The 
Supreme Court of Illinois granted judgment for the 
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Defendant City, and found that the limitations bore 
a reasonable and real relation to the objects of public 
health sought to be obtained and justified the sub-
ordination of individual rights. 
In the ALR citation the annotator summarizes 
the findings of his annotations as follows, at Page 801: 
Mthe great weight of authority 
is to the effect that a municip-
ality, in the discharge of its 
police power and duty to protect 
the health, safety, comfort, and 
general welfare of its residents, 
may regulate the removal of gar-
bage and rubbish within its limits 
by either taking such service upon 
itself as a governmental function, 
which it exercises through its 
employees, and exclude private 
operators from this field, or 
by contracting with private 
removal and disposal enter-
prises for the scavaging services 
of the latter, granting then for 
such services, an exclusive 
license or privilege... ,f 
Headnote 5 of the same annotation at Page 
819 quotes a large number of cases from various juris-
dictions on the question of exclusive collection by the 
City personnel, in these words: 
ffIn many cases municipalities 
have adopted ordinances or re-
gulations giving the government-
al body itself the exclusive right 
or privilege of operating garbage 
or rubbish removal services, ex-
cluding private operators from 
this field. Such provisions 
have been attacked, usually 
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by private scavengers, on a 
variety of grounds, involving 
claims that the enactment 
violated due process by un-
lawfully taking property in the 
scavenger business or in the 
garbage itself, or that an 
"."./'. lawful monopoly in restraint 
of trade was created, or that 
the regulation amounted to an 
improper revenue device. 
In the great majority 
of cases discovered, such 
attacks have been unsuccessful, 
the provision limiting to the 
municipality the right to collect 
and dispose of garbage or trash 
being regarded as a proper ex-
ercise of the municipalities 
police or other powers." 
A review of the most recent cases to pass 
on the case subject discloses two recent decisions which 
are consistent with the above. See the City of Spokane vs. 
Karlson, 436 P. 2(d) 454, and the City of Tigard vs. 
Werner 515 P. 2(d), 934(Oregon, 1973). 
The latter case heldthat absent come contract 
right in the scavenger, the municipality was not 
depriving the defendant of property without due process 
in passing and enforcing an exclusive ordinance re-
legating that duty to the City. 
CONCLUSION 
The weight of decisions from all of the 
jurisdictions quoted to the effect that a City has every 
right under the general police power whether set forth in 
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specific statute or not, to relegate the exclusive right 
to collect garbage to its own employees as a governmental 
function and that in so doing there is no violation of 
the due process clause or any other constitutional 
provision. 
Respectfully submitted this 21st day 
of July, 1975. 
:or Defendant-
Respondent Provo City 
Corporation 
Mailing Certificate 
Mailed 10 copies of Respondent's Brief 
to the Utah Supreme Court, Utah State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah; and 2 copies to Leon Halgren, 
Attorney for the Appellant at 325 South Third East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, postage prepaid this 21st day of 
July, 1975, at Provo, Utah. 
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